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Abstract— 1 Secrecy capacity of a multiple-antenna wiretap chan-
nel is studied in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. Expres-
sions for the first and second derivatives of the secrecy capacity
with respect to SNR at SNR = 0 are derived. Transmission strategies
required to achieve these derivatives are identified. In particular, it
is shown that it is optimal in the low-SNR regime to transmit in
the maximum-eigenvalue eigenspace of Φ = H†mHm − NmNe H
†
eHe
where Hm and He denote the channel matrices associated with the
legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, respectively, and Nm and Ne
are the noise variances at the receiver and eavesdropper, respectively.
Energy efficiency is analyzed by finding the minimum bit energy
required for secure and reliable communications, and the wideband
slope. Increased bit energy requirements under secrecy constraints
are quantified. Finally, the impact of fading is investigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure transmission of confidential messages is a critical issue
in communication systems and especially in wireless systems
due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions. In [1],
Wyner addressed the transmission security from an information-
theoretic point of view, and identified the rate-equivocation region
and established the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless
wiretap channel in which the wiretapper receives a degraded
version of the signal observed by the legitimate receiver. The
secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum communication rate
from the transmitter to the legitimate receiver, which can be
achieved while keeping the eavesdropper completely ignorant of
the transmitted messages. Later, these results are extended to
Gaussian wiretap channel in [2]. In [3], Csisza´r and Ko¨rner con-
sidered a more general wiretap channel model and established the
secrecy capacity when the transmitter has a common message for
two receivers and a confidential message to only one. Recently,
there has been a flurry of activity in the area of information-
theoretic security, where, for instance, the impact of fading,
cooperation, and interference on secrecy are studied (see e.g.,
[4] and the articles and references therein). Several recent results
also addressed the secrecy capacity when multiple-antennas are
employed by the transmitter, receiver, and the eavedropper [5]–
[9]. The secrecy capacity for the most general case in which
arbitrary number of antennas are present at each terminal has
been established in [8] and [9].
In addition to security issues, another pivotal concern in most
wireless systems is energy-efficient operation especially when
wireless units are powered by batteries. From an information-
theoretic perspective, energy efficiency can be measured by the
energy required to send one information bit reliably. It is well-
known that for unfaded and fading Gaussian channels subject
1This work was supported in part by the NSF CAREER Grant CCF-0546384.
to average input power constraints, energy efficiency improves
as one operates at lower SNR levels, and the minimum bit
energy is achieved as SNR vanishes [11]. Hence, requirements
on energy efficiency necessitate operation in the low-SNR regime.
Additionally, operating at low SNR levels has its benefits in terms
of limiting the interference in wireless systems.
In this paper, in order to address the two critical issues
of security and energy-efficiency jointly, we study the secrecy
capacity in the low-SNR regime. We consider a general multiple-
input and multiple-output (MIMO) channel model and identify
the optimal transmission strategies in this regime under secrecy
constraints. Since secrecy capacity is in general smaller than
the capacity attained in the absence of confidentiality concerns,
energy per bit requirements increase due to secrecy constraints. In
this work, we quantify these increased energy costs and address
the energy-secrecy tradeoff.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
We consider a MIMO channel model and assume that the
transmitter, legitimate receiver, and eavesdropper are equipped
with nT , nR, and nE antennas, respectively. We further assume
that the channel input-output relations between the transmitter
and legitimate receiver, and the transmitter and eavesdropper are
given by
ym = Hmx+ nm and ye = Hex+ ne, (1)
respectively. Above, x denotes the nT ×1–dimensional transmit-
ted signal vector. This channel input is subject to the following
average power constraint:
E{‖x‖2} = tr (Kx) ≤ P (2)
where tr denotes the trace operation and Kx = E{xx†} is
the covariance matrix of the input. In (1), nR × 1–dimensional
ym and nE × 1–dimensional ye represent the received signal
vectors at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, respectively.
Moreover, nm with dimension nR × 1 and ne with dimension
nE×1 are independent, zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with
E{nmn
†
m} = NmI and E{nen†e} = NeI, where I is the identity
matrix. The signal-to-noise ratio is defined as
SNR =
E{‖x‖2}
E{‖nm‖2}
=
P
nRNm
. (3)
Finally, in the channel models, Hm is the nR×nT –dimensional
channel matrix between the transmitter and legitimate receiver,
and He is the nE × nT –dimensional channel matrix between
the transmitter and eavesdropper. While being fixed deterministic
matrices in unfaded channels, Hm and He in fading channels
are random matrices whose components denote the fading coef-
ficients between the corresponding antennas at the transmitting
and receiving ends.
III. SECRECY IN THE LOW-SNR REGIME
Recently, in [8] and [9], it has been shown that when the
channel matricesHm andHe are fixed for the entire transmission
period and are known to all three terminals, then the secrecy
capacity in nats per dimension is given by2
Cs =
1
nR
max
Kx0
tr (Kx)≤P
log det
(
I+
1
Nm
HmKxH
†
m
)
− log det
(
I+
1
Ne
HeKxH
†
e
)
(4)
where the maximization is over all possible input covariance
matrices Kx  03 subject to a trace constraint. We note that
since log det
(
I+ 1/NmHmKxH
†
m
)
is a concave function of
Kx, the objective function in (4) is in general neither concave
nor convex in Kx, making the identification the optimal input
covariance matrix a difficult task.
In this paper, we concentrate on the low-SNR regime. In this
regime, the behavior of the secrecy capacity can be accurately
predicted by its first and second derivatives with respect to SNR
at SNR = 0:
Cs(SNR) = C˙s(0)SNR +
C¨s(0)
2
SNR2 + o(SNR2). (5)
Moreover, C˙s(0) and C¨s(0) also enable us to analyze the energy
efficiency in the low-SNR regime through [11]
Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2
C˙s(0)
and S0 =
2
[
C˙s(0)
]2
−C¨s(0)
(6)
where Eb
N0 s,min
denotes the minimum bit energy required for
reliable communication under secrecy constraints, and S0 denotes
the wideband slope which is the slope of the secrecy capacity in
bits/dimension/(3 dB) at the point Eb
N0 s,min
. These quantities pro-
vide a linear approximation of the secrecy capacity in the low-SNR
regime. While Eb
N0 s,min
is a performance measure for vanishing
SNR, S0 together with EbN0 s,min characterize the performance at
low but nonzero SNRs. We note that the formula for the minimum
bit energy is valid if Cs is a concave function of SNR, which we
show later in the paper.
The following result identifies the first and second derivatives
of the secrecy capacity at SNR = 0.
Theorem 1: The first derivative of the secrecy capacity in (4)
with respect to SNR at SNR = 0 is
C˙s(0) = [λmax(Φ)]
+ =
{
λmax(Φ) if λmax(Φ) > 0
0 else (7)
where Φ = H†mHm − NmNe H
†
eHe. Moreover, the second deriva-
2Unless stated otherwise, all logarithms throughout the paper are to the base e.
3 and ≻ denote positive semidefinite and positive definite partial orderings,
respectively, for Hermitian matrices. If A  B, then A − B is a positive
semidefinite matrix. Similarly, A ≻ B implies that A−B is positive definite.
tive of the secrecy capacity at SNR = 0 is given by
C¨s(0) = −nR min
{αi}
αi∈[0,1]∀iP
l
i=1
αi=1
l∑
i,j=1
αiαj
(
|u†jH
†
mHmui|
2
−
N2m
N2e
|u†jH
†
eHeui|
2
)
1{λmax(Φ > 0)} (8)
where l is the multiplicity of λmax(Φ) > 0, {ui} are the
eigenvectors that span the maximum-eigenvalue eigenspace, and
1{λmax(Φ) > 0} =
{
1 if λmax(Φ) > 0
0 else is the indicator
function.
Proof : We first note that the input covariance matrix Kx =
E{xx†} is by definition a positive semidefinite Hermitian matrix.
As a Hermitian matrix,Kx can be written as [13, Theorem 4.1.5]
Kx = UΛU
† (9)
where U is a unitary matrix and Λ is a real diagonal matrix.
Using (9), we can also express Kx as
Kx =
nT∑
i=1
diuiu
†
i (10)
where {di} are the diagonal components of Λ, and {ui} are the
column vectors of U and form an orthonormal set. Assuming
that the input uses all the available power, we have tr (Kx) =∑nT
i=1 di = P . Noting that Kx is positive semidefinite and hence
di ≥ 0, we can write di = αiP where αi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i and∑nT
i=1 αi = 1. Now, the secrecy rate achieved with a particular
covariance matrix Kx can be expressed as
Is(SNR) =
1
nR
(
log det
(
I+ nR SNR
nT∑
i=1
αiHmuiu
†
iH
†
m
)
− log det
(
I+
nRNm
Ne
SNR
nT∑
i=1
αiHeuiu
†
iH
†
e
))
.
(11)
where SNR is defined in (3). As also noted in [11], we can easily
show that d
dv
log det(I+ vA)|v=0 = tr (A), (12)
d2
dv2
log det(I+ vA)|v=0 = −tr (A2). (13)
Now, using (12), we obtain the following expression for the first
derivative of the secrecy rate Is with respect to SNR at SNR = 0:
I˙s(0) =
nT∑
i=1
αi
(
tr (Hmuiu
†
iH
†
m)−
Nm
Ne
tr (Heuiu
†
iH
†
e)
)
(14)
=
nT∑
i=1
αi
(
u
†
iH
†
mHmui −
Nm
Ne
u
†
iH
†
eHeui
)
(15)
=
nT∑
i=1
αiu
†
i
(
H†mHm −
Nm
Ne
H†eHe
)
ui =
nT∑
i=1
αiu
†
iΦui
(16)
where (15) follows from the property that tr (AB) = tr (BA).
Also, in (16), we have defined Φ = H†mHm− NmNe H†eHe. Since
Φ is a Hermitian matrix and {ui} are unit vectors, we have [13,
2
Theorem 4.2.2]
u
†
iΦui ≤ λmax(Φ) ∀i (17)
where λmax(Φ) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix
Φ. Recall that αi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i αi = 1. Then, from (17), we
obtain
I˙s(0) =
nT∑
i=1
αiu
†
iΦui ≤ λmax(Φ). (18)
Note that this upper bound can be achieved if, for instance,
α1 = 1 and αi = 0 ∀i 6= 1, and u1 is chosen as the
eigenvector that corresponds to the maximum eigenvalue of Φ.
Heretofore, we have implicitly assumed that λmax(Φ) > 0 and
all the available power is used to transmit the information in
the direction of the maximum eigenvalue. If λmax(Φ) ≤ 0, then
all eigenvalues of Φ are less than or equal to zero, and hence
Φ is a negative semidefinite matrix. In this situation, none of
the channels of the legitimate receiver is stronger than those
corresponding ones of the eavesdropper. In such a case, secrecy
capacity is zero. Therefore, if λmax(Φ) ≤ 0, we have C˙s(0) = 0.
Finally, we conclude from (18) and the above discussion that the
first derivative of the secrecy capacity with respect to SNR at
SNR = 0 is given by
C˙s(0) = [λmax(Φ)]
+ =
{
λmax(Φ) if λmax(Φ) > 0
0 else . (19)
If λmax(Φ) > 0 is distinct, C˙s(0) is achieved when we choose
Kx = Pu1u
†
1 where u1 is the eigenvector that corresponds
to λmax(Φ). Therefore, beamforming in the direction in which
the eigenvalue of Φ is maximized is optimal in the sense of
achieving the first derivative of the secrecy capacity in the low-
SNR regime. More generally, if λmax(Φ) > 0 has a multiplicity,
any covariance matrix in the following form achieves the first
derivative:
Kx = P
l∑
i=1
αiuiu
†
i (20)
where l is the multiplicity of the maximum eigenvalue,
{ui}
l
i=1 are the eigenvectors that span the maximum-eigenvalue
eigenspace, and {αi}li=1 are constants, taking values in [0, 1]
and having the sum
∑l
i=1 αi = 1. Therefore, transmission in the
maximum-eigenvalue eigenspace is necessary to achieve C˙s(0).
Next, we consider the second derivative of the secrecy capacity.
Again, when λmax(Φ) ≤ 0, the secrecy capacity is zero and
therefore C¨s(0) = 0. Hence, in the following, we consider the
case in which λmax(Φ) > 0. Suppose that the input covariance
matrix is chosen as in (20) with a particular set of {αi}. Then,
using (13), we can obtain
I¨s(0) = −nR tr

( l∑
i=1
αiHmuiu
†
iH
†
m
)2
+ nR
N2m
N2e
tr

( l∑
i=1
αiHeuiu
†
iH
†
e
)2 (21)
= −nR
∑
i,j
αiαj
(
|u†jH
†
mHmui|
2 −
N2m
N2e
|u†jH
†
eHeui|
2
)
(22)
where (22) is obtained by using the fact that tr (AB) = tr (BA)
and performing some straightforward manipulations. Note again
that {ui} are the eigenvectors spanning the maximum-eigenvalue
eigenspace of Φ. Being necessary to achieve the first derivative,
the covariance structure given in (20) is also necessary to achieve
the second derivative. Therefore, the second derivative of the
secrecy capacity at SNR = 0 is the maximum of the expression
in (22) over all possible values of {αi}. Hence,
C¨s(0) = −nR min
{αi}
αi∈[0,1]∀iP
l
i=1
αi=1
∑
i,j
αiαj
(
|u†jH
†
mHmui|
2 −
N2m
N2e
|u†jH
†
eHeui|
2
)
(23)
Since C¨s(0) is equal to the expression in (23) when λmax(Φ) >
0 and is zero otherwise, the final expression in (8) is obtained
by multiplying the formula in (23) with the indicator function
1{λmax(Φ) > 0}. 
Remark 1: In the absence of secrecy constraints, the first and
second derivatives of the MIMO capacity at SNR = 0 are [11]
C˙(0) = λmax(H
†
mHm) and C¨(0) = −
nR
l
λ2max(H
†
mHm) (24)
where l is the multiplicity of λmax(H†mHm). Hence, the first and
second derivatives are achieved by transmitting in the maximum-
eigenvalue eigenspace of H†mHm, the subspace in which the
transmitter-receiver channel is the strongest. Due to the optimality
of the water-filling power allocation method, power should be
equally distributed in each orthogonal direction in this subspace
in order for the second derivative to be achieved.
Remark 2: We see from Theorem 1 that when there are se-
crecy constraints, we should at low SNRs transmit in the direction
in which the transmitter-receiver channel is strongest with respect
to the transmitter-eavesdropper channel normalized by the ratio
of the noise variances. For instance, C˙s(0) can be achieved by
beamforming in the direction in which the eigenvalue of Φ is
maximized. On the other hand, if λmax(Φ) has a multiplicity,
the optimization problem in (8) should be solved to identify how
the power should be allocated to different orthogonal directions in
the maximum-eigenvalue eigenspace so that the second-derivative
C¨s(0) is attained. In general, the optimal power allocation
strategy is neither water-filling nor beamforming. For instance,
consider parallel Gaussian channels for both transmitter-receiver
and transmitter-eavesdropper links, and assume that H†mHm =
diag(5, 4, 2) and H†eHe = diag(2, 1, 1) where diag() is used to
denote a diagonal matrix with components provided in between
the parentheses. Assume further that the noise variances are
equal, i.e., Nm = Ne. Then, it can be easily seen that λmax(Φ) =
3 and has a multiplicity of 2. Solving the optimization problem in
(8) provides α1 = 5/12 and α2 = 7/12. Hence, approximately,
42% of the power is allocated to the channel for which the
transmitter-receiver link has a strength of 5, and 58% is allocated
for the channel with strength 4.
Remark 3: When λmax(Φ) > 0 is distinct, then beamforming
in the direction in which λ(Φ) is maximized is optimal in the
sense of achieving both C˙s(0) and C¨s(0). Moreover, in this case,
3
we have
C¨s(0) = −nR
(
‖Hmu1‖
4 −
N2m
N2e
‖Heu1‖
4
)
(25)
where u1 is the eigenvector that corresponds to λmax(Φ).
Remark 4: From [13, Theorem 4.3.1], we know that for two
Hermitian matrices A and B with the same dimensions, we have
λmax(A+B) ≤ λmax(A) + λmax(B). (26)
Applying this result to our setting yields
λmax(Φ) ≤ λmax(H
†
mHm)− λmin
(
Nm
Ne
H†eHe
)
. (27)
Therefore, we conclude from Remark 1 that secrecy constraints
diminish the first derivative C˙s(0) at least by a factor of
λmin
(
Nm
Ne
H†eHe
)
when compared to the case in which there
are no such constraints.
Remark 5: In the case in which each terminal has a single
antenna, the results of Theorem 1 specialize to
C˙s(0) =
[
|hm|
2 −
Nm
Ne
|he|
2
]+
(28)
C¨s(0) = −
[
|hm|
4 −
N2m
N2e
|he|
4
]+
. (29)
In the next result, we show that the secrecy capacity is concave
in SNR.
Proposition 1: The secrecy capacity Cs achieved under the
average power constraint E{‖x‖2} ≤ P is a concave function of
SNR.
Proof: Concavity can be easily shown using the time-sharing
argument. Assume that at power level P1 and signal-to-noise ratio
SNR1, the optimal input is x1, which satisfies E{‖x1‖2} ≤ P1,
and the secrecy capacity is Cs(SNR1). Similarly, for P2 and
SNR2, the optimal input is x2, which satisfies E{‖x2‖2} ≤ P2,
and the secrecy capacity is Cs(SNR2). Now, we assume that the
transmitter performs time-sharing by transmitting at two different
power levels using x1 and x2. More specifically, in θ fraction of
the time, the transmitter uses the input x1, transmits at most
at P1, and achieves the secrecy rate Cs(SNR1). In the remaining
(1−θ) fraction of the time, the transmitter employs x2, transmits
at most at P2, and achieves the secrecy rate Cs(SNR2). Hence,
this scheme overall achieves the average secrecy rate of
θCs(SNR1) + (1− θ)Cs(SNR2) (30)
by transmitting at the level θE{‖x1‖2} + (1 − θ)E{‖x2‖2} ≤
Pθ = θP1+(1−θ)P2. The average signal-to-noise ratio is SNRθ =
θSNR1 + (1 − θ)SNR2. Therefore, the secrecy rate in (30) is an
achievable secrecy rate at SNRθ . Since the secrecy capacity is the
maximum achievable secrecy rate, the secrecy capacity at SNRθ
is larger than that in (30), i.e.,
Cs(SNRθ) = Cs(θSNR1 + (1− θ)SNR2) (31)
≥ θCs(SNR1) + (1 − θ)Cs(SNR2), (32)
showing the concavity. 
We further note that the concavity can also be shown using
the following facts. As also discussed in [10], MIMO secrecy
capacity is obtained by proving in the converse argument that
the considered upper bound is tight and
Cs = max
p(x)
min
p(y′
r
,y
′
e
|x)∈D
I(x;y
′
r |y
′
e) (33)
where D is the set of joint conditional density functions
p(y
′
r,y
′
e|x) that satisfy p(y
′
r |x) = p(yr|x) and p(y
′
e|x) =
p(ye|x). Note that for fixed channel distributions, the mutual in-
formation I(x;y′r |y
′
e) is a concave function of the input distribu-
tion p(x). Since the pointwise infimum of a set of concave func-
tions is concave [14], f(p(x)) = minp(y′
r
,y
′
e
|x)∈D I(x;y
′
r |y
′
e)
is also a concave function of p(x). Concavity of the functional
f and the fact that maximization is over input distributions
satisfying E{‖x‖2} ≤ P lead to the concavity of the secrecy
capacity with respect to SNR.
We can now write the following corollary to Proposition 1 and
Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: The minimum bit energy attained under secrecy
constraints is
Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2
[λmax(Φ)]+
. (34)
Remark 6: From Remark 4, we can write
Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2
[λmax(Φ)]+
≥
log 2
λmax(H
†
mHm)− λmin
(
Nm
Ne
H
†
eHe
)
≥
log 2
λmax(H
†
mHm)
=
Eb
N0 min
(35)
where Eb
N0 min
in (35) denotes the minimum bit energy in the
absence of secrecy constraints. Hence, in general, secrecy re-
quirements increase the energy expenditure. When secure com-
munication is not possible, [λmax(Φ)]+ = 0 and EbN0 s,min =∞.
The expression for the wideband slope S0 can be readily
obtained by plugging in the expressions in (7) and (8) into that
in (6).
Remark 7: Energy costs of secrecy can easily be identified in
the single-antenna case. Clearly, the minimum bit energy in the
presence of secrecy is strictly greater than that in the absence of
such constraints:
Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2[
|hm|2 −
Nm
Ne
|he|2
]+ > log 2|hm|2 =
Eb
N0 min
(36)
when Nm
Ne
|he|
2 > 0. Furthermore, the energy requirement in-
creases monotonically as the value of Nm
Ne
|he|
2 increases. Indeed,
when Nm
Ne
|he|
2 = |hm|
2
, secure communication is not possible
and Eb
N0 s,min
=∞.
IV. THE IMPACT OF FADING
In this section, we assume that the channel matrices Hm and
He are random matrices whose components are ergodic random
variables, modeling fading in wireless transmissions. We again
assume that realizations of these matrices are perfectly known
by all the terminals. As discussed in [12], fading channel can
be regarded as a set of parallel subchannels each of which
corresponds to a particular fading realization. Hence, in each
subchannel, the channel matrices are fixed similarly as in the
channel model considered in the previous section. In [12], Liang
et al. have shown that having independent inputs for each
subchannel is optimal and the secrecy capacity of the set of
4
parallel subchannels is equal to the sum of the capacities of
subchannels. Therefore, the secrecy capacity of fading channels
can be be found by averaging the secrecy capacities attained for
different fading realizations.
We assume that the transmitter is subject to a short-term power
constraint. Hence, for each channel realization, the same amount
of power is used and we have tr (Kx) ≤ P . With this assumption,
the transmitter is allowed to perform power adaptation in space
across the antennas, but not across time. Under such constraints,
it can easily be seen from the above discussion that the average
secrecy capacity in fading channels is given by
Cs =
1
nR
EHm,He
{
max
Kx0
tr (Kx)≤P
log det
(
I+
1
Nm
HmKxH
†
m
)
− log det
(
I+
1
Ne
HeKxH
†
e
)}
(37)
where the expectation is with respect to the joint distribution of
(Hm,He). Note that the only difference between (4) and (37)
is the presence of expectation in (37). Due to this similarity, the
following result can be obtained immediately as a corollary to
Theorem 1.
Corollary 2: The first derivative of the average secrecy capac-
ity in (37) with respect to SNR at SNR = 0 is
C˙s(0) = EHm,He{[λmax(Φ)]
+} (38)
where again Φ = H†mHm − NmNe H
†
eHe. The second derivative
of the average secrecy capacity at SNR = 0 is given by
C¨s(0) = −nREHm,He
{
min
{αi}
αi∈[0,1]∀iP
l
i=1
αi=1
l∑
i,j=1
αiαj
(
|u†jH
†
mHmui|
2
−
N2m
N2e
|u†jH
†
eHeui|
2
)
1{λmax(Φ) > 0}
}
(39)
where 1{·} again denotes the indicator function, l is the multi-
plicity of λmax(Φ) > 0, and {ui} are the eigenvectors that span
the maximum-eigenvalue eigenspace for particular realizations of
Hm and He.
Remark 8: Similarly as in the unfaded case, C˙s(0) is achieved
by always transmitting in the maximum-eigenvalue eigenspace of
the realizations of the channel matrices Hm and He. In order
to achieve the second derivative, optimal values of {αi} (or
equivalently the optimal power allocation across the antennas)
should be identified again for each possible realization of the
channel matrices.
Remark 9: In the single-antenna case in which nT = nR =
nE = 1, the first and second derivatives of the average secrecy
capacity become
C˙s(0) = Ehm,he
{[
|hm|
2 −
Nm
Ne
|he|
2
]+}
(40)
C¨s(0) = Ehm,he
{[
|hm|
4 −
Nm
Ne
|he|
4
]+}
. (41)
Corollary 3: The minimum bit energy achieved in fading
channels under secrecy constraints is
Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2
EHm,He{[λmax(Φ)]
+}
. (42)
Remark 10: Fading has a potential to improve the low-SNR
performance and hence the energy efficiency. To illustrate this,
we consider the following example. Consider first the unfaded
Gaussian channel in which the deterministic channel coefficients
are hm = he = 1. For this case, we have
C˙s(0) =
[
1−
Nm
Ne
]+
and Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2[
1− Nm
Ne
]+ . (43)
Now, consider a Rayleigh fading environment and assume that
hm and he are independent, zero-mean, Gaussian random vari-
ables with variances E{|hm|2} = E{|he|2} = 1. Then, we can
easily find that
C˙s(0) = Ehm,he
{[
|hm|
2 −
Nm
Ne
|he|
2
]+}
=
Ne
Nm +Ne
(44)
leading to Eb
N0 s,min
= log 2Ne
Nm+Ne
. Note that if Ne > 0, NeNm+Ne >[
1− Nm
Ne
]+
. Hence, fading strictly improves the low-SNR per-
formance by increasing C˙s(0) and decreasing the minimum bit
energy even without performing power control over time. Further
gains are possible with power adaptation. Another interesting
observation is the following. In unfaded channels, if Nm ≥ Ne,
the minimum bit energy is infinite and secure communication
is not possible. On the other hand, in fading channels, the bit
energy is finite as long as Nm is finite and Ne > 0. Clearly,
even if Nm ≥ Ne, favorable fading conditions enable secure
transmission in fading channels.
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